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Abstract
The replicator dynamics of players choosing either mixed or pure strategies are
usually regarded as equivalent, as long as strategies are played with identical fre-
quencies. In this paper we show that a population of pure strategies can be invaded
by mixed strategies in any two-player game with equilibrium coexistence upon the
addition of an arbitrarily small amount of noise in the replication process.
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The understanding of the spontaneous emergence of cooperation is central
to uncover the origin of complex social organizations in populations of selfish
genes. The general framework employed (Nowak(2006)) supposes a population
interacting in pairs by playing evolutionary games representing social dilem-
mas. The individuals choose among a repertoire of behaviors and the outcome
of these interactions affects their reproductive fitness. In the simplest case
these individuals can be regarded as players of a game with two strategies
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represented by a 2×2 payoff matrix. As the game is interactively played, indi-
viduals with larger payoffs will thrive with larger reproductive fitnesses while
those with worse performances will eventually perish.
Recent experimental evidence (Kummerli et al.(2007)) suggests that the iter-
ated Snowdrift Dilemma (SD) (Doebeli & Hauert(2005)) may be more suitable
for explaining the high levels of cooperation observed among unrelated human
individuals than the more intensively studied iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. In
a SD each player can in each turn either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The
cooperative behavior by at least one individual yields a benefit b to both play-
ers. If both individuals cooperate each one contributes c/2 to the total cost,
otherwise the total cost c is payed by the cooperator alone. Mutual defection
yields no benefit or cost to any player.
The replicator dynamics (Hofbauer & Sigmund(1998)) for the evolutionary
SD game yields a simple prediction. If there are only cooperators in the pop-
ulation, a defector will have the advantage and will invade. Similarly, in a
population of defectors, a cooperator can also invade. A fixed point is reached
when cooperators are observed with probability pC = 1− c/(2b− c).
It is generally assumed that it makes no difference whether the population is
composed by genes playing pure defective (D) or cooperative (C) strategies in a
proportion defined by pC or by genes playing mixed strategies with probability
of cooperating pC . Notice that a gene can play a mixed strategy either by
creating individuals who play mixed strategies or by having a proportion of
its carriers to behave as cooperators while the others behave as defectors. In
other words an arbitrary population of pure strategists is thought to be stable
against a population of mixed strategy players, given that the probability of
2
cooperating is tunned to be pC .
In the following we will analyze the effect of a random drift on pure and
mixed strategies playing games with equilibrium coexistence having the SD
as a major example.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
Let us suppose a well-mixed population playing an evolutionary two-player
game with strategies C and D and payoff matrix given by:
A =


aCC aCD
aDC aDD


, (1)
with aCC < aDC and aCD > aDD, implying strategies that coexist at equilib-
rium with cooperators at frequency:
pC = 1−
aCD − aDD
aDD − aCC + aCD + aDC
. (2)
Suppose this population to be composed of mixed strategists at frequency
xM playing C with probability pC , pure defectors and pure cooperators at
frequencies xD and xC , respectively.
The replicator dynamics is given by (Nowak(2006)):
x˙a = xa
(
fa − f¯
)
, (3)
where xa and fa are, respectively, the frequency and the payoff (or fitness)
of type a players and f¯ =
∑
a xafa is their mean fitness. Considering that
xM +xC +xD = 1, we can eliminate one of the three equations in (3) to write:
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x˙C = (fC − fD)
[
(1− pC)(xC − x2C) + pCxCxD
]
(4)
x˙D = (fC − fD)
[
pC(x
2
D − xD)− (1− pC)xCxD
]
,
with
fC − fD = −
aCD − aDD
1− pC
[(1− pC)xC − pCxD] . (5)
It can be easily verified that the dynamical system in (5) has a line of fixed
points defined by xD = xC(1 − pC)/pC . The linear stability of these fixed
points can be studied by calculating the Jacobian matrix in the neighborhood
of the line to find:
J = −(aCD − aDD)xC


(1− pC) −pC
−(1− pC) pC


, (6)
which has a stable eigen-direction v1 = (1,−1) with eigenvalue λ1 = −(aCD−
aDD)xC and a degenerate eigen-direction v0 = (1, (1− pC)/pC). As expected,
this analysis reveals that a population composed by pure strategies at equi-
librium and by mixed strategies is stable regardless of the frequency xM of
mixed strategists.
In figure 1 we represent this general picture in a simplex with special attention
to the fact that stable eigenvalues depend on xC .
[Fig. 2 about here.]
To assess the behavior along the stable line we introduce a random perturba-
tion as xD = x(1− pC)/pC + ǫ, xC = x and xM = 1− xC − xD − ǫ with ǫ > 0
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if x = 0 and ǫ < 0 if x = pC to find:
x˙ ≃ pC(aCD − aDD)ǫx, (7)
Let us now suppose that the replication of each and every one of the strate-
gies is randomly influenced by global environmental changes. This may be
represented by adding noise in the mapping of payoffs into fitnesses. To as-
sess this scenario we replace the perturbation in (7) by a Wiener process as
ǫtdt = σdWt (Oksendal(2000)). We can then show that this component leads
to a drift toward a population composed exclusively by mixed strategies (point
xM in figure 1). That can be seen by changing variables in (7) to write the
following stochastic differential equation in Itoˆ form:
d log(x) = αdWt −
1
2
α2dt, (8)
where α = σpC(aCD − aDD). We now consider an initial population with
pure strategies and a positive, but very small, frequency of mixed strategies
x ≃ pC . Assuming very small fluctuations (σ very small), equation (8) yields
the following approximation for the probability density for x:
ρt(x) =
1
α
√
2πt
exp

−
(
log x
pC
+ 1
2
α2t
)
2
2α2t

 , (9)
that converges as t→∞ to ρ
∞
(x) = δ(x), to say, to populations concentrated
around xM = 1. In figure 2 we show a simulation for the replicator dynamics
of the SD game with b = 4 and c = 2. The initial condition is set to be the
evolutionary equilibrium with cooperators to be found at frequency pC and
a single mixed strategy with probability pC of cooperating. As predicted, the
population of pure strategies is led to extinction by mixed strategies.
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The general picture that emerges can be described as follows. Suppose that
the population has been brought to a rest point. From there, any change in
the proportion of the mixed strategies that keeps the proportion of the pure
strategies unaltered will not change the matching probabilities when the game
is played and therefore, this will correspond to a perturbation along a stable
eigen-direction, with no consequences other than the random change.
A different scenario is observed if the ratio of the pure strategies is somehow
altered. When that happens, matching probabilities will change to a point near
the rest point. And, while the mixed strategy is still playing the evolutionary
equilibrium answer to the game, the pure strategies are no longer doing that.
This means that some of them might be better than average (those that have
become rarer), while others will certainly be worse (the strategies that became
more common). This will cause the system to move closer to the rest point,
restoring the equilibrium, as expected in the basin of attraction. However,
an important effect happens here. The mixed strategy was playing the best
answer and therefore, its fitness becomes larger than the average until the
equilibrium is restored, regardless of the direction of departure. This means
that any time a drift that changes the relative proportions of pure strategies
happens, the mixed strategy will increase its proportion. In the long run, it
will slowly dominate the game and the drift will cause the extinction of all
pure strategies.
We emphasize that the conclusion above holds for any game with equilib-
rium coexistence and we have used the SD case as an example. That means
that any analysis of evolutionary processes or of the emergence of cooperation
should also be performed without the supposition that strategies breed true.
In the long run, mixed strategies will have a higher probability of survival and
6
this fact should be taken into consideration when evolutionary dynamics is
considered.
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Fig. 1. Simplex for a game with equilibrium coexistence, pure and, mixed strategies.
The thick dashed line represents fixed points. Stable eigen-directions are represented
by arrows with lengths proportional to the related eigenvalues.
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Fig. 2. Simulation of the Snowdrift game with b = 4 and c = 2 starting with a
population of pure strategy playing at the evolutionary equilibrium and one single
mixed strategy.
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